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FROM LOVING V VIRGINIA TO WASHINGTON V DAVIS: THE
EROSION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S EQUAL PROTECTION
INTENT ANALYSIS
Angela Onwuachi-Willig
INTRODUCTION

N 1967, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion that contained its most searing and explicit condemnation of white supremacy:
Loving v. Virginia.' At issue in Loving was the constitutionality of a statutory scheme in the state of Virginia that prohibited marriages between
individuals solely on the basis of race.2 Among other things, provisions
in this statutory scheme punished intermarriage between a "white person" and a "colored person," meaning not only Blacks,3 but also Asian
Americans and American Indians who did not fall under the Pocahontas
Exception.4 The provisions also punished evasion of the state's interra-

1Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
2Id.at 2.

' Throughout this Essay, we capitalize the words "Black" and "White"
when we use them as nouns to describe a racialized group; however, we do not
capitalize these terms when we use them as adjectives. Additionally, we find
that "[i]t is more convenient to invoke the terminological differentiation between black and white than say, between African-American and Northern European-American, which would be necessary to maintain semantic symmetry between the two typologies." Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas
in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev.
1043, 1044, n.4 (1992). Professor Kimberl Crenshaw, one of the founders of
Critical Race Theory, has explained that "Black" deserves capitalization because
"Blacks, like Asians [and] Latinos, .. .constitute a specific cultural group and,
as such, require denotation as a proper noun." Kimberl Williams Crenshaw,
Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1331, 1332, n.2 (1988). Also, we generally
prefer to use the term "Blacks" to the term "African Americans" because
"Blacks" is more inclusive. For example, while the term "Blacks" encompasses
black permanent residents or other black noncitizens in the United States, the
term "African Americans" includes only those who are formally Americans,
whether by birth or naturalization. That said, given the historical nature of several parts of this Essay, and in light of the fact that a large influx of black immigrants did not occur in the United States until the 1960s and 1970s, we sometimes use the term "African American" where the term "Black" is not needed
for inclusivity reasons. See Kevin R. Johnson, The End of "Civil Rights " as We
Know It?: Immigration and Civil Rights in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L.
REv. 1481, 1484 (2002) ("The year 1965 thus marked the beginning of a much
more diverse, far less European immigrant stream into this country.").
4 Va. Code Ann. §§20-54, 1-14 (1960 Repl.Vol), invalidated by Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The "Pocahontas Exception" is a term used by
scholars to refer to the statute's classification of distant descendants of Native
Americans as "white persons." See Kevin Noble Maillard, The Pocahontas
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cial marriage ban by Virginians who chose to legally marry each other in
another state and then return to live together as spouses in Virginia.5 Indeed, Section 20-59 of the statutory scheme subjected individuals who
violated Virginia's anti-miscegenation laws to imprisonment for one to
five years. 6
In 1958, Mildred Jeter, a black and American Indian woman,' and
Richard Loving, a white man, violated Virginia's anti-miscegenation
statutory scheme when they travelled to Washington, D.C. to get married
and then returned to Caroline County, Virginia to reside as husband and
wife.8 The state of Virginia indicted the Lovings for violating its antimiscegenation laws, and the Lovings pled guilty to crimes charged
against them. 9 The trial judge in the case initially sentenced each of the

Lovings to one year in prison; however, he offered to suspend their sentences on the condition they leave Virginia for 25 years without any return.'0 Famously, the trial judge asserted:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow,
malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement
there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact
that he separated the races shows that he did not intend
for the races to mix. 1
Accepting the trial judge's conditional offer for a suspended sentence, the Lovings moved to Washington, D.C.' 2 However, a homesick
Mildred disliked living in Washington, D.C. so much that the Lovings
ultimately filed a class action that challenged Virginia's antimiscegenation statutory scheme.' 3 Nearly a decade later, the United
States Supreme Court decided the lawsuit in the Lovings' favor.14 In so
doing, the Court rejected the state of Virginia's argument that its antimiscegenation laws did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution because they equally restricted and punished Blacks and

Exception: The Exemption ofAmerican Indian Ancestry from RacialPurity Law,

12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 351 (2007) (explaining the origins and outcomes of the
"Pocahontas Exception").
5Loving, 388 U.S. at 4-5.
6Id.

7 Robert A. Pratt, Essay, Crossing the Color Line: A HistoricalAssessment
and PersonalNarrative of Loving v. Virginia, 41 How. L.J. 229, 230 (1998).
8 Loving, 388 U.S. at 2-3.
9
Id. at 3.
10

Id.
112 Id.
Id.
13

Id.; see also Pratt, supra note 7, at 237 (describing how Mildred hated liv-

ing in14 the city and wanted her children to grow up in the country).
Loving, 388 U.S. at 9-13.
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Whites. 15 The Court also proclaimed that the invidious nature of Virginia's anti-miscegenation laws was evident, in part, from the fact that
"[t]he statutes proscribe[d] generally accepted conduct if engaged in by
members of different races."' 6 Finally, the Court rebuffed the state of
Virginia's argument that it had enacted its anti-miscegenation statutes as
a means of protecting the purity of the races. The Court reasoned, "The
fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white
persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their
own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy."'
In other words, the very fact that the statute prohibited only marriage
between a white person and a "colored person," meaning Blacks, Asian
Americans, and American Indians, and did not preclude marriages between colored people of different races, exposed the real motive behind
the statute: maintenance of white supremacy.' 8
The Loving decision portended a promising future for analyses of
discriminatory intent in equal protection cases. After all, the Court in
Loving was willing to engage in the type of analysis that could uncover
the motives behind the state's legislative actions, despite any formal
"equal" treatment of different racial groups. Specifically, the Court was
willing to address two key questions in its evaluation of the Lovings'
claims and, more so, the state's intent: (1) whether Virginia's enactment
of the statutory scheme made sense in light of its stated purpose, and (2)
what types of statutes would Virginia have enacted if it actually wanted
to achieve its stated purpose.
Fast forward nine years later to the Court's opinion in Washington v.
Davis in 1976,'9 and the Court had all but abandoned this willingness to
interrogate the meaning and true intent behind governmental actions.
Washington v. Davis addressed whether the Washington, D.C. Police Department's procedures for selecting officers discriminated against black
applicants on the basis of race." The Court's inquiry in Washington v.
Davis focused exclusively on the Department's use of Test 21, "'an examination that is used generally throughout the federal service,' which
'was developed by the Civil Service Commission, not the Police Department,' and which was 'designed to test verbal ability, vocabulary,
reading and comprehension,"' but which had not been validated by the
Department, in its selection process.2 ' Both parties to the lawsuit agreed
that the use of Test 21 "excluded a disproportionately high number of
15
16

Id.at 8-10.

Id.at 11.
Id.
18 Angela Onwuachi-Willig, There 'Just One Hitch, Will Smith: Examining
Title VII, Race, and Casting Discriminationon the FortiethAnniversary of Loving v. Virginia, 2007 WiSC. L. REV. 319, 324.
19Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
20
Id.at 232-33.
21 Id. at 234-35.
17
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Negro applicants"- "four times as many blacks as whites failed the
test. '22 Still, the Department claimed it needed to administer Test 21 to
confirm that applicants had "acquired a particular level of verbal skill" in
order to communicate orally and in writing as an officer, including
through police reports. 23 The plaintiffs in Washington were all Blacks
who had applied for police officer positions but were denied such positions based on their Test 21 scores. They wanted the Court to affirm the
lower court's holding that proof of discriminatory intent was not necessary to prove an equal protection violation, extending the same rules24that
applied in Title VII disparate impact cases to equal protection cases.
In the end, the Court refused to affirm the Court of Appeals decision,
declaring that "the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose" in equal protection cases. 2' Furthermore, the Court held that there
was no proof of discriminatory intent on the part of the Washington,
D.C. Police Department. Just like the trial court, the Court reasoned that
there could be no discriminatory intent where "44% of new police recruits were black, a figure proportionate to the blacks on the total force
and equal to the number of 20- to 29-year-old blacks in the recruiting
area" 26 and where "the Department had systematically and affirmatively
sought to enroll black officers[,] many of whom passed the test but failed
to report for duty."' 2' Additionally, the Court upheld the Department's use
of Test 21, noting that "the test was a useful indicator of training school
performance," despite the fact that it had no validated a relationship to
actual job performance, and asserting that the test "was not designed to,
28
and did not, discriminate against otherwise qualified blacks.
Washington v. Davis dealt a devastating blow to the future of civil
rights litigation: its intent requirement essentially made it impossible for
plaintiffs to prove an equal protection violation. 29 Although, as Professor
Id. at 230, 233.
Id. at 245-46.
24
Id. at 237.
25 Id. at 240.
26
Id. at 229.
27
Id. at 235.
2
1 Id. at 229.
29 See Mario Barnes, "The More Things Change.
New Moves for Legitimizing Racial Discrimination in a "Post-Race" World, 100 MINNESOTA L.
REv. 2043, 2077 (2016) ("In cases such as Washington v Davis and McCleskev
v. Kemp, both involving facially race-neutral government practices, the Court
found no availability to assert a constitutional claim without specific reference
to a particular actor who intentionally discriminated against a suspect class
member. In these cases, where applying such a precedent would benefit people
of color, the Court refuses to peek under the veneer of facial neutrality in the
law or treat impact as sufficient evidence of intent."); see also Alan David
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discriminationthrough Antidiscrimination law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1056
22

23
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Katie Eyer illustrates, the intent doctrine initially emerged during the
1960s as a more progressive means for "invalidating invidiously intended but facially race-neutral government action" (much like the state action in Loving), it was, as she also explains, later "re-appropriated by
racial justice opponents as a means of circumscribing efforts to allow for
constitutional invalidation on non-intent-based grounds.'30 In this sense,
Eyer details, the intent doctrine that re-emerged in Washington v. Davis

transformed the meaning of the Court's 1960s intent doctrine, adopting
an extremely narrow meaning of the word "intent" to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in equal protection cases and thus making it
harder for the Equal Protection Clause to be used as a means for eliminating discrimination as it was actually practiced. 3' Like many other race
scholars, I find the Court's requirement for proof of discriminatory intent
in equal protection cases very troubling.3 2 However, in this Essay, I do

(1978) (contending that by requiring evidence of intent, the Court adopted a
"perpetrator perspective" which saddles the plaintiff with the "nearly impossible
burden of isolating the particular conditions of discrimination produced by and
mechanically linked to the behavior of an identified blameworthy perpetrator");
Alan Goldman, Employment Discrimination- Washington v. Davis: Splitting the
Causes of Action Against Racial Discriminationin Employment, 8 Loy.U. CHI.

L. J. 225, 227 (1976) (hypothesizing that the more demanding intent standard
the Court required in Washington v. Davis will drastically diminish the utility of
bringing an equal protection claim in employment discrimination cases); Katherine Lambert, DiscriminatoryPurpose: What It Means under the Equal Protection Clause - Washington v. Davis, Note, 26 DEPAUL L. REv. 26 650, 650 (1977)

(describing the Court's discriminatory purpose standard as "far more difficult"
for plaintiffs to satisfy than proving disproportional impact under Title VII employment discrimination claims).
30 Katie Eyer, Ideological Drift and the Forgotten History of Intent, 51

HARv.C.R.-CL. REv. 1, 4 (2016).
31 Id. (citing Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111, 1113

(1997)).
32 Many scholars have criticized the Court's discriminatory intent requirement. See, e.g., R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and

Equality in Context, 79 N.YU.L. REv. 803, 809 (2004), (extending Professor
Charles Lawrence's critique of Washington v. Davis to argue that "racial stigma,
not intentional discrimination or unconscious racism, is the true source of racial
injury in the United States"); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317,

319 (1987) (noting that "[m]inorities and civil rights advocates have been virtually unanimous in condemning Davis and its progeny"); Gayle Binion, "Intent"
and EqualProtection:A Reconsideration, 1983 SuP. CT.REv. 397 (1983) (contending that the Court's holding establishing intent as a necessary element of an
Equal Protections claim deviated from the text of the Fourteenth Amendment as
well as the Court's previous interpretations of the amendment); Robert A.
Sedler, The Constitution and the Consequences of the Social History of Racism,

40 ARK. L. REV. 677, 693 (1987) (arguing that the Court should have instead
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not delve into a critique of the discriminatory purpose requirement in
equal protection cases. Instead, I take a deeper look at the mistakes that
the Court made in evaluating and deciphering "intentional discrimination" and "racially motivated discrimination" in Washington v. Davis.
Specifically, I consider how the plaintiffs in Washington v. Davis, and
thus later equal protection lawsuits, might have fared better if the Court
had followed the same analytical approach that it undertook to determine
discriminatory intent in Loving. First, I explore what the result in Washington v. Davis might have been if the Court had, as it did in Loving,
asked whether the government's actions made sense in light of its stated
purpose. Specifically, I consider what the decision in Washington v. Davis would have been like if the Court had looked underneath the Department's use of Test 21 made sense as a way of ensuring that police officers had the verbal skills necessary to perform their jobs. Relatedly, I
consider what the result in Washington v. Davis might have been if the
Court had more closely evaluated the Department's actions to assess
whether its attempts to recruit more diverse police force had been in
good faith.33
In making these considerations, I first highlight how the Court completely failed to consider how the Washington, D.C. Police Department's
decision to continue using Test 21, despite the fact that its reliability for
predicted actual job performance had not been validated, could have
served as proof of an intent to exclude Blacks from the Department's
ranks. After all, the Department's continued use of the Test itself may
have served as proof that the Department sought to limit the presence of
Blacks or even the "kinds" of Blacks who filled its ranks.34 In so doing, I
also turn a critical lens to Griggs v. Duke Power Company,35 which foreshadowed the Court's abandonment of its prior willingness to dig behind
the meaning of any workplace policies and hiring practices that treated
Blacks and Whites the same on face. Thereafter, I point out flaws in the
Court's conclusion that the Washington, D.C. Police Department could
not have intentionally discriminated against Blacks because it was engaged in efforts to diversify its workforce. I do this by exploring whether
put forth a standard examining if the consequences of a statute will have a racially discriminatory effect); David A Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the
Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 951-954 (1989) (explaining that the
Court's intent standard unnecessarily limits the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit explicit racial discrimination but not prejudice or stigma).
33 Washington, 426 U.S. at 246.
34 DEVON W. CARBADO & MiTu GULATI, ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING

RACE IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA (2013) ((explaining how in the post-Civil
Rights era, employers know they cannot exclude, for example, all Blacks and
thus include those who are racially palatable); see also Anthony Alfieri & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Next Generation of Civil Rights Lawtyers: Race and Representation in the Age of Identity Performance, 122 YALE L.J. 1484, 1514
(2013)(same).
35 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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the Department's actual actions fell in line with its stated goals, much
like the Court questioned Virginia's actions in Loving. Exploring these
arguments in further depth first requires a foundational understanding
about the questions on Test 21 itself.
I.

UNDERSTANDING TEST

21 AND THE FLAWS IN USING IT AS A

MEANS OF EVALUATING THE COMMUNICATION SKILLS OF
POLICE OFFICE APPLICANTS

Test 21, which the Washington, D.C. Police Department used as a
screening mechanism in its hiring process in Washington v. Davis, consisted of 80 multiple choice questions.36 Although the test had not been
validated as predictive of job performance, the Department claimed it
used Test 21 in order to ensure "some minimum verbal and communicative skill [that] would be very useful, if not essential," in performing the
job of a police officer."
In spite of the Department's strong reliance on the test as a tool for
determining which applicants had the communicative skills necessary for
being a police officer, Test 21 was not centered on the topics or types of
conversations that officers frequently encountered on the job. Simply
reviewing a small representative sample of the questions on Test 21 reveals as much. For instance, question 6 concerned the use of palm tree
dates as a source of food in Africa, Asia, and other locations:
6. (Reading) "Dates are the fruit of a species of palm
tree which ranges from the Canary Islands through
northern Africa and the southeast of Asia to India. These
trees have been cultivated and their fruit much prized
throughout most of these regions from remotest antiquity. In Arabia date palms are an important source of national wealth, and their fruit forms the staple article of
food in the country."
The quotation best supports the statement that date
palms
A) are the chief source of wealth in many countries
B) have long been valued as a source of food
C) were first grown in the Canary Islands and Africa
D) were not prized for their fruit in early times
E) cannot be grown in other than tropical climates3 8

See Test 21 (on file with author).
7 Washington, 426 U.S. at 250.
38 See Test 21.
36
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Similarly, Question 73 inquired about the definition of a word that few
police officers, particularly those in Washington, D.C., have ever used in
performing their duties: promontory. Question 73 read:
73. PROMONTORY means most nearly
A) marsh
B) monument
C) headland
D) boundary
E) plateau39
Ironically, Question 64 on Test 21 describes exactly what the Department failed to do when it designed its process for selecting new officers:
64. (Reading) "Adhering to old traditions, old methods,
and old policies at a time when new circumstances demand a new course of action may be praiseworthy from
a sentimental point of view, but success is won most
frequently by facing the facts and acting in accordance
with the logic of the facts."
The quotation best supports the statement that success is
attained through
A) recognizing necessity and adjusting to it
B) using methods that have proved successful
C) exercising will power
D) remaining on a job until it is completed
40
E) considering each new problem separately
The correct answer to Question 64 asserts that entities must adjust to
shifting circumstances by adopting new courses of action rather than
"[a]dhering to old traditions, old methods, and old policies."' 41 Yet, the
police department from Washington v. Davis did exactly the opposite
when it insisted on using Test 21 in its hiring processes. Social context
was quickly making clear that the Department's overwhelmingly white
police force was ill-equipped to interact well and protect the largely
black population of Washington, D.C., and that the Department needed
new means for communicating and working with the city's black resi-

39

id.

40[d.
41

Id.
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dents. In November 1967, less than three years before the plaintiffs filed
their lawsuit in Washington v. Davis, 80 percent of the Department was
white42 while the city itself was nearly 70 percent black.4 3 During that
year and the next, several events exposed the gaps in the D.C. Police
Department's ability to effectively police, communicate with, and protect
the black residents of Washington, D.C.. On April 4, 1968, Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee, a tragedy that
sparked riots and protests within black communities all across the nation.44 Within D.C., more than 1,200 fires burned within the city's
boundaries in response to the murder of Dr. King.45 Together, the riots
and fires resulted in what the D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency estimated to be more than $13 million in damages.46 And, in the midst of the
1968 uprisings, government officials mobilized the overwhelmingly
white, 2,800-member police force, plus4 more
than 13,000 federal troops,
7
in an effort to regain control of the city.
Less than one year after Dr. King's assassination and nearly five
years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the nation's most comprehensive civil rights statute, was enacted, the Washington, D.C. Police Department began to engage in greater efforts to recruit black police offic-

42

See John W. Hechinger Sr. & Gavin Taylor, Black and Blue: The D.C.
City Council vs. Police Brutality, 1967-69, 11 WASH. HISTORY 4, 10 (2000)

(noting that when the former Chairman of the D.C. City Council arrived in office in November of 1967, "80 percent of the policemen were white").
41 See Michael Ruane, Fifty Years Ago Some Called D.C. 'The Colored
Man ' Paradise.' Then Paradise Erupted, WASH. POST (March 26, 2018),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/locallfifty-years-ago-some-called-dc-thecolored-mans-paradise-then-paradise-erupted/2018/03/22/6ae9ec lc-208e-1 1e894da-ebf9d112159c story.html? utm term-.d9ce60d8b967) (stating that in
1968, 68 percent Washington, D.C.'s population was black).
4 Alan Taylor, The Riots That Followed the Assassinationof Martin Luther
King
Jr.,
THE
ATLANTIC
(April
3,
2018),

https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2018/04/the-riots-that-followed-theassassination-of-martin-luther-king-jr/557159/
Lorraine Boissoneault, Martin Luther King Jr.'s Assassination Sparked
Uprisings in Cities Across America, SMITHSONIAN MAC (April 4, 2018),
45

https://www.smithsonianmag. com/history/martin-luther-king-jrs-assassinationsparked-uprisings-cities-across-america- 180968665/#yqcczcbbdzHfJtGw.99
46

DaNeen L. Brown, A Black Bank Witnessed DevastationAfter The 1968
'The Future Is Bright.' WASH. POST (March 26, 2018),

Riots. Now

https://www.washingtonpost.com/localla-black-bank-witnessed-devastationafter-the-i 968-riots-now-the-future-is-bright/2018/03/22/069fde30-lcf9-11 e8b2d9-08e748f892c0 story.html?utm term-.4a67dac7adc0
41 John Mullen, The Legacy of DC's 1968 Riots, GREATER GREATER
WASHINGTON (April 8, 2011), https://ggwash.org/view/8938/43-years-agotoday-dc-stopped-burning; see also Ruane, supra note 42 (discussing the role of
the federal troops).
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ers to its rolls, presumably in order to better communicate with and work
with the city's residents.48
II.

WHAT IF THE WASHINGTON V DAVIS COURT HAD FOLLOWED THE

PATH iN LOVING?

Had the Court in Washington v. Davis analyzed the facts and claims
before it just like the Loving Court did in 1967, it likely would have concluded that the plaintiffs had offered sufficient proof of an intent to discriminate by the Washington, D.C. Police Department, specifically because the Department's use of Test 21 made absolutely no sense in light
of its stated purpose, ensuring officers had effective communication
skills for the job. However, instead of taking the Loving Court's approach of examining the logic and social meaning behind the government's actions, the Court in Washington v. Davis chose to adopt a narrower conception of the word "intentional."
Although the Court's opinion in Washington v. Davis actually included promising language-language that suggested the possibility of a
broader meaning of the terms "intentional" or "racially motivated"-the
Court ultimately landed on a definition that belied its own words. Promising language in the opinion consisted of declarations (1) that equal protection law does not require "that the necessary discriminatory racial
purpose be express or appear on the face of the statute, 4 9 (2) that "[a]
statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race,"50 and (3) that "an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily
on one race than another."'" Still, the Washington v. Davis Court chose
not to delve into the totality of the factual circumstances of the case in a
way that could have uncovered an intent to discriminate against Blacks,
either by limiting the number of black officers in the D.C. Police Department or by restricting the type of Blacks who would be entering the
police department's ranks. For example, the Court failed to ask critical
questions related to the position's required "special ability to communicate orally and in writing."52 Specifically, the Court failed to ask exactly
what kind of communication skills were needed by the Department's
police officers to perform their jobs: it did not inquire into whom the
The Court described the district court's finding that "[s]ince August 1969,
44% of the new police force had been black [...]" as "undisputed" evidence that
"the Department had systemically and affirmatively sought to enroll black officers [...].'
Washington, 426 U.S. at 235.
49
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 241.
50 id.
51Id. at 242.
52 Id. at 246. Ironically, the conjunctive phrase "communicate orally and in
writing" fails to follow the rule of parallel construction.
48
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D.C. Police Department officers regularly communicated with or whom
needed to better communicate with, nor did it ask what language or understanding of the world the officers needed to comprehend such communications. Yes, the officers had to know how to read and write language well enough to write police reports and understand the basics of
the law, but as the riots of 1968 revealed, the officers also needed
knowledge of how to more effectively communicate with the city's
largely black citizenry. In spite of this reality, the Court did not question
the Department's failure to create a test that would have directly focused
on the types of communications that its officers were most likely to engage in. In other words, the Court failed to interrogate whether the Department truly wanted to hire officers who could engage in the types of
communications that were truly needed to effectively serve and protect
the overwhelming majority of black citizens in the city.
Relatedly, the Court failed to ask another question that the Loving
Court posed, one which would have shed light on the questions concerning the D.C. Police Department's possible intent to discriminate on the
basis of race: "What actions would the defendant have taken if it truly
wanted to fulfill its stated purpose?" In the Loving case, the Court explained that the state of Virginia would have prohibited all interracial
marriages, and not just those between Whites and non-Whites if it truly
wanted to accomplish its stated objective of protecting the "purity" of
the "races." In Washington v. Davis, the parallel question would have
been: "What actions would the D.C. Police Department have taken if it
really wanted to achieve its stated goal of being racially diverse and inclusive and having a more accessible hiring process?"
Rather than engaging in a searching inquiry about the meaning of the
D.C. Police Department's actions in using Test 21, the Court essentially
assumed both good faith in hiring a diverse police staff on the behalf of
the police department, which had a supervisory group of white decisionmakers, and presumed meaningful success in achieving that diversity. In other words, the Court blindly accepted the Department's claim
that it was actively engaged in efforts to become a more diverse police
force-what I would call the Department's "we're trying" defense.
Moreover, the Court applauded the D.C. Police Department for its
claimed success in hiring a diverse police force:
Since August 1969, 44% of new police force recruits
had been black; that figure also represented the proportion of blacks on the total force and was roughly equivalent to 20- to 29-year-old blacks in the 50-mile radius in
which the recruiting efforts of the Police Department
had been concentrated. 3

"- Id. at 235.

2018]

Equal Protection Intent Analysis

The Court, however, failed to ask the most probative question in its
evaluation of the claims in Washington v. Davis, which was first filed in
April 10, 1970. It did not examine the most telling evidence about the
Department's efforts to diversify its rank: the policies implemented between 1965, when Title VII became effective, and April 1970, the month
in which the lawsuit was filed. Instead, the Court focused only on the
Department's recruitment efforts after August 1969, a mere eight months
before the case was filed, and six years of recruitment data from after the
lawsuit was filed-precisely the period when the Department would
have been on its best behavior. The most probative evidence, which really would have shed light on whether the good faith and good motive
that the Court imputed to the Department was accurate, would have been
the evidence regarding diverse hiring in the 4 and a half years before the
lawsuit was filed and before the Department knew its hiring patterns
were under scrutiny. The Court, however, never even bothered to ask
about that data. 4
Moreover, it is unclear why the Court ever assumed good faith on
the part of the Department. After all, the Department had not validated
the test to establish its reliability for measuring actual performance. The
Department demonstrated only that there "was a positive relationship[,
though not predictive,] between Test 21 scores and performance in police
training courses," but provided no clear evidence about a positive or predictive relationship between the test and actual success on the job or
even between the training and actual performance on the job.5 .56
Basically, despite some promising language, the Court in Washington v. Davis ended up requiring proof of total or near total exclusion of
the target group in the post-Civil Rights era that made such total exclusion illegal. In this regard, the Court ignored the point that scholars like
Devon Carbado, Mitu Gulati, and Judge Guido Calabresi have made
about the post-Civil Rights era of inclusion in the workplace: that in a
post-Civil Rights world, employment discrimination may not be about,

54 Furthermore, the Department never presented the raw numbers presenting its hiring. After all, 44% could mean 5 out of 11, or it could mean 88 out of
200.
55
56

Washington, 426 U.S. at 250.
The Court also never asked why a disproportionate number of African-

American officers engaged in the act of taking the test only to fail to report for
duty. Washington, 426 U.S. at 235. It never even considered that there could be
some nefarious reason why African-American officers failed to report to duty
after passing the test. For instance, were black candidates being discouraged or
pushed away from the job? Were they not given information about where to
report for work? Or, if, for example, transportation obstacles were a reason for
this disproportionate no-show problem, why wasn't this supposedly properly
motivated Department working to address those systemic obstacles? The Court
chose not to address any of these questions.
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or often is not about, full exclusion of a disfavored group. Instead, discrimination is now about limiting that group's presence in the workplace.
Not only did the Court give the benefit of the doubt to the employer,
the D.C. Police Department, in Washington v. Davis, it engaged in an
empathetic examination of the Department's efforts to diversify its
ranks. 5 The Court's examination was very much rooted in the myopic
perspective of some of the most privileged men in the nation-here, 8
out of 9 white men with elite law school educations. Had the Court followed the approach of Loving, the end result certainly would have been a
more just decision in not just Washington v. Davis, but in all other equal
protection cases to come.

" See CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 34; see also Holcomb v. Iona College., 521 F.3d 130, 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (Calabresi,J., concurring) (holding that
the plaintiff's case survive summary judgment even as not all Blacks were excluded from involvement with the basketball teams because discrimination
could be shown just by the school's desire "to minimize the number of Afiican
Americans involved with the basketball team.)
"8 Reva Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38
(2013) (describing how the empathy that justice had for white plaintiffs in cases
involving challenges to affirmative action has resulted in "one body of law governing minority complaints that was deferential to democratic actors, and another body of law responsive to majority complaints that closely scrutinized democratic decisionmaking").

